02040nam a2200289 a 4500 1/51317 051115s2005 be u pdd 0 a0gre d 92-894-8870-0 1016-8060 (print) 1725-3187 (online) ECFIN/002734/05-EN 33198 GR-PeUP eng ΚΕΤ Αλφαβητική σειρά Collie, David R. State aid to investment and R&D / Collie David R. Brussels- Belgium: European Comission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2005. 14 σ.: πιν. 30 εκ. European Economy. Economic papers ; The prohibition of state aid to investment and R&D in an integrated market such as the European Community is analysed in a Cournot oligopoly model where firms undertake investment or R&D to reduce their costs. Both strategic and non-strategic investment and R&D are considered. Governments in the Member States give subsidies for investment and R&D, which are financed by distortionary taxation so the opportunity cost of government revenue exceeds unity. • Prohibiting state aid to investment will always increase aggregate welfare. • Prohibiting state aid to R&D will always increase aggregate welfare if spillovers from R&D are small. • If spillovers from R&D are moderate then there exists a range of values for opportunity cost where governments give state aid and where the prohibition of state aid will increase aggregate welfare. • Prohibiting state aid to R&D will reduce aggregate welfare if spillovers from R&D are large. Economic Papers European Commission : Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Economic Papers July 2005, No 231. European Economy. Economic papers ; 231. INST UNIPILB KET 20090311 EEEP 231 EEEP 231 NOLOAN 23 1 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary622_en.htm