01805cam a2200289 a 4500 1/51296 051123s2004 lu u pdd 0 0eng 92-894-5971-9 1016-8060 (print) 1725-3187 (online) ECFIN/003748/04-EN 33167 GR-PeUP eng ΚΕΤ Αλφαβητική σειρά Buti, Marco. Fiscal policy in EMU : rules, discretion and political incentives / Buti Marco, Noord Paul van den. Brussels ; Belgium : European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2004. 44 σ. ; 30 εκ. The fiscal philosophy of EMU's budgetary rules is to bring deficits close to balance and then let automatic stabilisers play freely. Given the large tax and benefit systems in Europe, relying mainly on automatic stabilisation would allow a relatively high degree of cyclical smoothing while avoiding the typical pitfalls of fiscal activism. While this is, in most circumstances, good economic policy, it is evidently not regarded as good politics. The current difficulties of EMU's fiscal policy framework have little to do with its alleged fault lines and much to do with the resurgence of electoral budget cycles amid a weak system of incentives to abide by the agreed rules. Economic Papers Noord, Paul van den. European Commission : Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Economic papers July 2004, No 206. European Economy. Economic papers ; 206. INST UNIPILB KET 20090311 EEEP 206 EEEP 206 NOLOAN 23 1 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary694_en.htm